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False Truths
Isidora Stojanovic
ENS “ Institut Jean-Nicod
published in Fernando Martinez Manrique and Luis Miguez Peris-Viné (Eds.), Actos des V Congreso
de la Sociedad de Logica, Metodologia y Filoso  a de la Ciencia en Espana, 2006: pp. 75-80)
One of the most interesting and fruitful applications of logics, classical or other, has
been in supplying formal frameworks for the semantics of natural language. In this
paper, I discuss the following puzzle: there seem to be arguments that are logically
valid - more precisely, that are instances of the rule of universal instantiation, and yet,
the utterance of the premise is intuitively true while the conclusion is false. I will
discuss two strategies, developed in response to different sorts of problems, that seem
immediately applicable to this puzzle. While the so-called contextualist strategy blocks
the puzzle at the level of syntax, the index-shifting strategy actually embraces the
apparently paradoxical claim that there are logically valid arguments with premises
whose utterances are true and a conclusion whose utterance is false, but insists that
different points of evaluation come into play in determining the truth values of the
utterances involved in the alleged counter-instances to rules of logic.
1. Some Preliminaries
Given any formal framework for natural language semantics, there are two basic
assumptions that one ought to make about the framework:
1. Conformity to logic:
Our semantic framework should not assign value False, or 0, to logically valid
sentences, that is, sentences derivable in one's preferred deduction system (such as,
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say, natural deduction for   rst order logic). And more generally, if the framework
assigns value True, or 1, to each among the sentences S1,..., Sn, and if sentence S
logically follows from the set {S1,...,Sn}, that is, if it is derivable from this set by a
  nite application of inference rules from the deduction system, then the framework
should also assign value True to S.
2. Conformity to competent speakers' intuitions:
If the majority of competent speakers are inclined to judge that a given sentence S,
on a given occurrence, is true, then the framework had better assign it value True.
Now, of course, both assumptions call for an important quali  cation. Normally, a
semantic framework for natural language does not assign a truth value to sentences on
their own. Consider the sentence "He is a philosopher". It would be silly to suppose
that our semantics, even given a possible world, should decide whether the sentence is
true or false. It is crucial to know who is being referred to by the pronoun. Thus if this
sentence is uttered in a conversation about, say, John Perry, who is indeed a
philosopher, it should be assigned value True with respect to the actual world, and
value False with respect to those possible worlds in which Perry is not a philosopher,
while if the same sentence is uttered while talking about the Italian singer Toto
Cutugno, it should be assigned value False with respect to the actual world, and True
with respect to the worlds in which Cutugno happens to be a philosopher.
Since the 70's and the work of David Lewis, David Kaplan and others, it is widely
accepted that there are (at least) two parameters that the assignment of truth values to
natural language sentences should take into account. Unfortunately, there is not only
theoretical disagreement regarding the nature of those two parameters, but
considerable terminological divergeance as well. Kaplan talks of contexts and of
circumstances (of evaluation), while Lewis calls the   rst parameter context and the second
index.1 In the work of Robert Stalnaker, both parameters are possible worlds, and what he
calls context is yet a third thing, namely a certain set of possible worlds (those that are
compatible with the conversational background). In his recent work, Stefano Predelli
1 See Kaplan: Demonstratives, in Almog et al. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford UP (1989), and
Lewis: Index, Context and Content (1980).
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expresses concerns, which I share, about calling "context" any among the technical
parameters with which the semantic framework operates, because of a heavy load of
connotations. He opts for what he takes to be neutral terminology, calling index the   rst
parameter (Kaplan's context) and point of evaluation the second (Kaplan's circumstance), so
that the objects to which a semantic framework assigns truth values are sentence-index
pairs, and the truth value assignments are functions of points of evaluation.2
Let us use, as usual, the notation [[..]] for the semantic value function, that is, for the
function that takes an expression, an index and a point of evaluation as inputs, and
returns that expressions's semantic value as output. In the case of a sentence, the value
is either 0 (False) or 1 (True).3 For the sake of simplicity, the assignment function (which
assigns values to free variables) will be seen as part of the index parameter. Finally, if i
is an index variable (in the meta-language) and w a point of evaluation variable, the
two basic assumptions on frameworks for natural language semantics will read as
follows:
1. For any i and any w, if [[S1]]i, w=1, [[S2]]i, w=1,..., [[Sn]]i, w=1, and if S1,..., Sn | S,
then [[S]]i, w=1.
2. If a natural language sentence s, as uttered in a given context, is judged true by
competent speakers (given a suitable description of what the world is like), if
sentence S is an adequate translation for s, if index j captures the relevant
information about the context of utterance, and if point of evaluation k does so for
the (remaining) factual information necessary to determine the truth value of the
utterance, then we should have [[S]]j, k=1. Similarly, if the sentence is judged false,
we should have [[S]]j, k=0.
Spelling out some among the preliminaries, as we have just done, already takes us half
a way towards the solution to the puzzle that we haven't laid down yet, which is what I
am turning to now.
2 See Predelli: Contexts, Oxford UP (2005). In fact, Predelli is also reluctant to talking of sentences
and prefers to talk of clauses.
3 For the time being, let us leave it open whether [[..]] may be a partial function, that is, undefined for
certain inputs.
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2. A Failure of Universal Instantiation?
Suppose that, talking of a dinner that took place during some philosophy conference, I
say:
1) Everyone was a philosopher.
Since, let's assume, there were no non-philosopher at that dinner, (1) is intuitively true.
But now consider the following, as uttered right after (1), hence presumably in the
same context:
2) Toto Cutugno was a philosopher.
By the rule of universal instantiation, (2) logically follows from (1). Yet (2) is false.
The puzzle may be laid down more explicitly as follows:
i. "Everyone was a philosopher. Therefore, Toto Cutugno was a philosopher."
expresses a logically valid inference. In fact, it expresses a straightforward instance
of the rule of universal instantiation: ∀xFx | F[x/b], where F may be any
predicate, and b may be any constant.4
ii. (1) is intuitively true. Hence, if S1, in the formal language, is a translation for (1),
and if i1 and w1 are respectively the index representing the context relevant for the
interpretation of (1) (presumably, the dinner of the philosophy conference) and the
point of evaluation relevant to determining the truth of (1) (presumably, the state of
affairs at that dinner), then, given assumption 2, we ought to have [[S1]]i1, w1=1.
iii. (2) is intuitively false. Hence, if S2, in the formal language, is a translation for (2),
and if i2 and w2 are respectively the index representing the context relevant for the
interpretation of (2) (presumably, that same dinner) and the point of evaluation
relevant to determining the truth of (2) (presumably, the state of affairs at that
dinner), then, given assumption 2, we ought to have [[S2]]i2, w2=0.
claim. Since it is plausible to assume that (1) and (2) were uttered in the same context,
and that their truth depends on the same state of affairs, we have it that i, ii and iii lead
4 Let us put aside the question of how the past tense, and tenses in general, ought to be represented.
Note that nothing important hinges on this.
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to contradiction, given assumption 1.
The obvious ways of dispelling the puzzle would be either to take issue with one of the
three clauses, or to take issue with the claim itself that those clauses are inconsistent. It
is the latter strategies “ those that do reject none of the clauses, but make room for
their mutual compatibility, that are most promising. But let us mention, and discard
right from the outset, a strategy that would deny ii: the so-called literalist strategy.
A literalist will instist that (1) is actually false, though it may convey something true.
There are two ways of running the literalist strategy. One would be to take issue with
the claim that (1), as uttered at the philosophy conference, at which, by assumption,
there were only philosophers, is intuitively true. And it is doubtlessly the case that there
can be competent English users whose intuitions on the truth value of (1) might be
”literalistfi in this sense, and who would take (1) to be false. However, the considerable
literature on quanti  er domain restriction appears to agree on this much, that the
majority of speakers intuitively do take (1) to be true in the situation at stake. I will take
those linguistic data for granted, and leave out of consideration the strategy that will
dispute this claim. But the other, better known way of being a literalist is to say that,
while accepting that (1) is intuitively true, the truth value that semantics should assign to
(1) ought to be false. In other words, one would deny the idea that speaker's intuitions
have a say on the semantic content.5 But this is tantamount to rejecting assumption 2,
laid out at the outset as a basic and non-negotiable assumption about natural language
semantics. For this reason, the literalist strategy cannot be considered as offering a
solution to our puzzle.
3. The Contextualist Move
The tradition that goes under the name of (indexical) contextualism accepts all the three
clauses above (with some reserve with respect to i, as we shall see), but disputes the
claim that those clauses lead to a contradiction. The contextualist thinks that there is
5 Defenders of this sort of literalism include Kent Bach, Emma Borg, Herman Cappelen, Ernie
Lepore, Scott Soames, relevance theorists, and so on.
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some equivocation in clause i. For him, "Everyone was a philosopher. Therefore, Toto
Cutugno was a philosopher." expresses a logically valid inference only if quanti  cation
is unrestricted, that is, is the formal translations for the two sentences are respectively
'∀x(Philosopher(x))' and 'Philosopher(Toto).' But this is not, he would say, the correct
translation for the utterance in (1). Rather, the correct translation is something like
'∀x(Dom(x) P→ hilosopher(x))', where Dom is a higher-order variable that takes as its
values either predicates or sets, depending on the version adopted. With respect to
index i1, Dom will presumably receive as its value the predicate 'people at that dinner',
or the corresponding set of people. And from this we cannot derive that Toto Cutugno
is a philosopher, unless we have the additional premise
Dom(Toto) (w.r. to i1), which we don't. Hence, there is no contradiction.
Now, I have just depicted the contextualist solution using a very old-fashioned account
of natural language quanti  ers. Even though this is not crucial, let me move, for the
sake of accuracy, to representations in terms of generalized restricted quanti  ers. Here
is what we would then have instead of the original clause i:
iv. "Everyone was a philosopher. Therefore, Toto Cutugno was a philosopher."
expresses a logically valid inference. In fact, it expresses an instance of a valid
derivation that uses the rule of universal instantiation and the rule of modus
ponens: [∀x:Gx]Fx, G[x/Toto] | F[x/Toto], where, applied to our example, G
is the predicate encoded by '-one' in 'everyone' (presumably, something like 'animate
human'), F is 'philosopher'. Note, though, that the premise G[x/Toto], though not
explicitly stated, follows from the lexical knowledge that Toto Cutugno is the name
of a person (rather than, say, of a city).
Now, once we reformulate in this way our clause i, the contextualist's point will be that
[∀x:Gx)]Fx is not yet the correct translation for (1). Rather, the correct translation is
[∀x:Gx Dom∧ (x)]Fx. Again, since we don't have the premise that Toto Cutugno
belongs to Dom, we don't have a counter-instance to any logically valid inference.
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4. Index-shifting
Indexical contextualism, as its name indicates, makes crucial use of the parameter of
index (or context) in the semantics that it provides for natural language quanti  ers,
because the value for variable Dom (which restrict the quanti  er's domain) is provided
by the index. But the role of providing values for indexicals, whether overt (such as
pronouns and demonstratives) or hidden (such as quanti  er domains) is only one of the
two roles that the index plays in Kaplanian theories. The other role is that of
determining the point of evaluation that will establish the truth value of the sentence
(relative to that index). To acknowledge this double role of indices points to another
way of making the semantics of quanti  ers index-sensitive, a way that does not have to
stipulate any phonetically unrealized variables in the syntactic form of sentences
containing quanti  ers. For, if we suppose that the domain of quanti  cation may vary
across points of evaluation, then the same sentence containing a quanti  er may be
true with respect to one point and false with respect to another, even if the two points
agree and all the facts about the world; and the truth value of the sentence will depend
on the index with respect to which the sentence is evaluated.
Now, there is nothing really new in this move. For, consider a standard Kaplanian
theory that does not stipulate a unique domain for all possible worlds. In such a theory,
the truth value of sentences containing quanti  ers will depend on the index, since the
index   xes the possible world. So, for instance, the sentence ”Some philosophers are
Frenchfi is true if evaluated at the index of the actual world, but false when evaluated
at worlds that are like the actual world except that they do not contain any French
philosophers. Now, if we want to make the same move in order to account for the
variability in the truth value of sentences considered as all evaluated at the actual
world, then either the world parameter in the point of evaluation is to be thought of as
what is sometimes called ”small worldsfi, or as situations, or else, the points of
evaluation should contain a distinguished parameter for the domain of quanti  cation.
Going back to our example, the sentence in (1), ”Everyone is a philosopherfi, will be
true if evaluated at an index whose domain contains among human beings only
philosophers, such as the situation of the dinner of the philosophy conference, and
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false if paired with an index whose domain contains some non-philosophers.
We now have all the elements to present the index-shifting strategy of dealing with the
puzzle. This is the strategy that Predelli (2005) deployed to deal with cases that exhibit
the same pattern: the premises are intuitively true, the conclusion is false, and yet, the
inference appears to be logically valid. But Predelli's cases are signi  cantly different: he
is concerned with situations in which one can truly say ”This table is 2m longfi, yet in
which an utterance of ”This table is more than 1999 mm longfi turns out to be false.
Predelli's explanation is that the second utterance shifts the standards of precision from
low to high, hence the truth of the two sentences depends on points of evaluation that
differ on the standards of precision. However, there is no evidence that Predelli would
use the same strategy to deal with cases that involve quanti  ers.
The index-shifting strategy, as I suggest applying it to our puzzle, will also dispute the
claim that the truth of (1) and the falsity of (2) are inconsistent with the validity of the
inference S1|S2. But, unlike contextualism, the index-shifting strategy respects
surface syntax, and admits [∀x:-one(x)]Philosopher(x) and Philosopher(Toto) as   ne
translations for (1) and (2). What it will deny, though, is that (1) and (2) are really
uttered in the same context. Hence i1– i2, and possibly w1–w2 as well. The idea is that
when (2) is uttered, the mere mention of Toto Cutugno makes the index shift, and
brings to salience a larger situation, one that besides the philosophers at the dinner
also contains Toto Cutugno, and maybe other Italian singers. And, while we have
[[S1]]i1, w1=1, it takes little to see that [[S1]]i2, w2=0. So the falsity of (2) does not
contradict the truth of (1), because for a contradiction to take place, the two truth
values would need to be established with respect to one and the same index.
There is a lingering worry, though. For, what is the value of [[S2]]i1, w1? We cannot say
that [[S2]]i1, w1=0, because we then get again a contradiction. So presumably, we
should say that [[S2]]i1, w1 is unde   ned. But that is almost as much of a problem. For, we
have a true premise that leads to a conclusion that is neither true nor false, which is at
odds with assumption 1. Fortunately, though, we can step out of the worry by
amending our basic assumption with this proviso:
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For any i and any w, if [[S1]]i, w=1, [[S2]]i, w=1,..., [[Sn]]i, w=1, if S1,..., Sn | S, and if
[[S]] is defined in (i, w), then [[S]]i, w=1.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have discussed a problem for any natural language semantics that
preserves logical validity and conforms to speakers' intuitions. The problem lies in
cases of logically valid inferences whose premises are uttered truly while the conclusion
is uttered falsely. I have discussed two strategies of explaining the problem away. While
the contextualist strategy manipulates the syntax of sentences containing quanti  ers,
the index-shifting strategy manipulates the parameters at which those sentences are
evaluated for truth. Unfortunately, I lack the space to compare the two strategies, or
discuss their applications to further puzzles of the same pattern 'T| F'.
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